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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN REPLY 
An employer who is "actively participating" in the work process of a contractor is liable for 
failing to exercise reasonable care. Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (I Jtah 1999) I here w as abundant 
evidence in the record that Dave Roth Construction (DRC), through its construction supervisor, Brett 
Campbell, "actively participated" in the work of delivering truss joists to the Weinerschnitzel job 
site, by arranging the delivery, coordinating contact between Ted Alexander, the truck driver, and 
the crane operator; by helping to place the wet straps on the wet load that fell in an incorrect and 
dangei ous manner; and failing to exercise his prerogati\ e to halt opei ations en: warn "\ v orkers who 
were under the load. The recitation of "cherry-picked" facts by DRC basically argues those parts of 
the record, but, additionally, appears to implicitly concede that Magana's testimony that Brett 
Campbell was "actively participating" in rigging the load creates a genuine issue of in fa 
DRC instead subtly shifts the discussion to whether DRC "controlled" the unloading of the trusses. 
However, the test of liability is not so narrow ly conceived; because Bi ett Campbell (DRC) "actively 
participated" in the negligent unloading process, Magana has a claim for liability for that negligence. 
Under the Restatement of Torts, 2d, §424, the employer, here, DRC, retains liability for the 
negligence of the contractor, here, ABM Crane Rentals, for the negligent rigging and handling of the 
truss joist load that fell on Celso Magana. ABM was required to follow a number of safety 
regular: <• • ... ngging and lifting of the truss load, and DR C could not just delegate those away, 




MAGANA'S TESTIMONY SHOWS "ACTIVE PARTICIPATION" BY 
DRC'S SUPERINTENDENT, BRETT CAMPBELL 
Magana testified that Brett Campbell was up on the trailer helping to rig the load that fell on 
him. Magana's facts starkly contrast with those in Thompson. In Thompson, the landowner, the 
contracting party, was not on the location when the negligent conduct and accident occurred. Unlike 
DRC, she was not in the business of constructing buildings. She did not enter into a "labor-only" 
arrangement, reserving all other elements of control to herself. She did nol actively participate in 
supervising how the work was done, and did not actually participate herself, as DRC and Brett 
Campbell did here. The contrast in facts between Thompson and this case could not be clearer. 
After Thompson v. Jess, and Local Gov't Trust v. Wheeler Machinery, 2006 UT App 513, 
154 P.3d 175 were decided, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "retained control" doctrine in 
Begaye v. Big D Construction, 2008 UT 4. In Begaye, the general contractor, Big D, had hired a 
subcontractor to construct a "rebar wall", but did not actually assist in, or supervise, the construction 
of that wall. The wall was insufficiently braced, and it collapsed on Begaye, killing him. To make 
the Begaye fact setting similar to Magana, imagine that the Big D supervisor had actually assisted 
in negligently constructing the rebar wall that fell on Begaye. Those facts were missing in Begaye, 
and illustrate why Magana falls within the "retained control" exception, and Begaye does not. 
Other similar cases: Hooker v. Dep't of Trans, 27 Cal.4th 198, 115 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. 
2002). Hooker involved a crane operator working for a general contractor hired by the California 
2 
Department of Transportation. I lew as killed vv henhesw ungtheci ane boom while the "outriggers" 
were retracted, making the crane unstable. His heirs sued, and the California Supreme Court 
concluded that: 
. . . a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable to an employee of the contractor 
merely because the hirer retained control over safety conditions at a work site, but 
that a hirer is liable to an employee of a contractor insofar as a hirer 's exercise of 
retained control affirmatively contributed !o the.employee's injuries. 
Hooker, at 201 . Hooker cites Thompson v. Jess with ,\m\ r ;i / ^ r s . * , ^ : r -<; * 
allowing liability for a hirer 's "active participation". Interestingly, Thompson had followed the 
California Supreme 11<>iu1 s earlier decision inPrivette v. Sup. Ct., 5 Cal.4th 689, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 
(Cal. 1993). The California Supreme Court has recently re-affirmed an older decision holding a hirer 
of an independent contractor crane company liable for refusing to ask the power company to de-
energize power lines directly over or adjacent to the work area. Kinsman v. I Jnt n ial Corp ., 37 Cal.4th 
659,36 Cal.Rptr. 495 (Cal. 2005), affirming the holding ofAustin v. Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 
225 (Cal. 1 v 5 5)(t»wner/hirer liable for refusing to de-energize power lines over crane operation site). 
The involvement of the owner/hirer in controlling the energizing of the overhead power lines was 
sufficient "active participation" to support liability. 
In Lawson-Avila Construction, Inc. v. Stoutamire, 791 S.W 2d 584 ( I ex \pp 1990), the 
Texas Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence of "retained control" to go to the jury, 
where the general contractor's superintendent failed to hire a competent crane operator, and failed 
to supervise the operation of a crane, to prevent it from tipping over. Lawson-Avila extensively 
reviews evidence supporting retained control in the context of O.S.H.A. regulations governing use 
3 
of cranes. The supervisor for Lawson-Avila had contractual authority to require safe construction 
practices, while Brett Campbell apparently had oral or implied authority, as he himself testified. The 
Lawson-Avila superintendent walked the job, and gave safety advice where necessary, as did Brett 
Campbell. The Lawson-Avila superintendent had the ultimate responsibility for safety, as did Brett 
Campbell. However, Brett Campbell had more than authority to act; he was present when the roof 
trusses were off-loaded and actually participated. Compare Rogers v. West Construction Co., 623 
N.E.2d 799 (111. App. 1993)(no evidence that general contractor was involved in subcontractor using 
crane to unload beams); Gneiting v. Idaho Asphalt Supply, Inc., 941 P.2d 932 (Idaho 1997)(crane 
accident, no evidence employer of independent contractor was involved in work); Pestka v. Town 
of Fort Sheridan Co., 862 N.E. 2d 1044 (111. App. 2007)(no evidence general contractor was aware 
of unsafe crane unloading situation before load fell). 
Under the authority of Thompson v. Jess, and Wheeler, the summary judgment should be 
reversed, for the fact-finder to determine whether DRC should be held liable. Magana' s case presents 
a far more compelling fact situation than that in Lawson-Avila, because Brett Campbell (DRC) was 
actually on site, watching and helping with the crane unloading roof trusses. As the superintendent 
of the general contractor, he had notice and an opportunity to act safely, and he did not. Instead, he 
acted in an unsafe manner, in deciding to go ahead in off-loading wet roof trusses, and helping rig 
the load in an unsafe manner. Summary judgment should not have been granted. 
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POINT TWO 
DRC SHIFTS FROM A "NO DUTY" ARGUMENT TO A 
"NO NEGLIGENCE" ARGUMENT 
Conceding the "active participation" standard set for by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999) in adopting the Restatement of Torts, 2d, §414 
"Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Employer", DRC now shifts to argue that there was 
no negligence on its part. The basis for this end-run around Thompson is Brett Campbell's assertion 
that no one knows which person strapped which end of the load of trusses. This artfully avoids the 
point that there was negligence that was broader than just a failure to tie a knot correctly. The 
decision to strap up a wet load of trusses, and the system of strapping were both acts of negligence 
that either person, Brett Campbell (of DRC) or Ted Alexander (of Circle T) could have, and should 
have seen as dangerous. Both were aware of the way that Valdez (ABM Crane) was lifting the load, 
over other persons, without the required statutory warnings, and without proper tag lines. With these 
principles in mind, the actions of Brett Campbell and DRC constituted "actively participation" rather 
than "passive non-participation". 
Further, the issue of negligence was not raised and briefed in the original motion for 
summary judgment by DRC. DRC only argued that it did not "actively participate", not that its 
"active participation" was, in fact, negligent. The reason is that DRC claimed that Brett Campbell 
did not help rig the load that fell on Magana. That issue was not specifically briefed, and, 
specifically, the testimony and report of Magana's expert on crane loading and operation was not 
made part of the record. DRC s argument that it was not negligent in its "active participation" should 
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be deferred to the trial court, for consideration in the ordinary fashion on a motion for summary 
judgment, after briefing by the parties. 
POINT THREE 
DRC HAD NO DUTY FROM AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS 
ACTIVITY IN USING A CRANE IN OFF LOADING TBE ROOF 
TRUSSES OR THE PECULIAR RISK THEREOF 
Magana originally argued that the activity of unloading truss joists that weigh 3,800 pounds 
up into the air, and then placing them on the ground, is an inherently dangerous activity, making the 
employer, DRC, liable for the negligence of ABM Crane Rental. Restatement of Torts. 2d, §416 
"Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions". Magana further referenced the related 
Restatement of Torts. 2d, §413 relating to "Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against 
Dangers Involved In Work Entrusted to Contractor". This section is commonly referred to as the 
"peculiar risk doctrine". Further, the Restatement of Torts. 2d, §427 "Negligence as to Danger 
Inherent in the Work". As DRC points out, Thompson v. Jess specifically foreclosed these sections 
of the Restatement to employees of the independent contractor, Circle T, including Magana. 
POINT FOUR 
DRC UNDERTOOK A DUTY TO PROVIDE PRECAUTIONS REQUIRED 
BY FEDERAL REGULATIONS WHEN IT ARRANGED TO USE A 
CRANE IN OFF-LOADING THE ROOF TRUSSES 
DRC concedes that the act of lifting heavy loads by crane is subject to detailed regulations 
by OHSA. These are found at 29 C.F.R. §1910.179(n)(3)(vi): "The employer shall require that the 
operator avoid carrying loads over people." A similar provision is found at 29 C.F.R. 
§1810.180(h)(3)(vi) and (h)(4)(h). Further, whenever a load "approaches near or over personnel, the 
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warning signal shall be sounded". Id., at 1910.179(n)(3)(xi); see 1910.180(h)(4)(ii)("No person 
should be permitted to stand or pass under a load on the hook"). Whichever provision is applied, 
there is a statutory regulation to prevent this exact scenario. Violation of this statutory regulation 
creates liability on both the operator and the employer: 
One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide 
specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the 
others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a 
contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions. 
Restatement of Torts. 2d, §424 "Precautions Required by Statute or Regulation". 
DRC argues that there was no showing that it is an "employer" under the 29 C.F.R. 
§1910.179(n)(3)(vi). However, it seems obvious that it is "a person engaged in a business affecting 
commerce who has employees . . ." . It also seems obvious that Circle T is such a person. 
Further, DRC did not argue to the trial court that neither it nor Circle T was engaged in "a 
business affecting commerce . . ." , but ignored this argument at the trial court. It is too late now to 
dispute the reach of this federal regulation, or, at least, it is too late now to raise the argument as a 
matter of law. If DRC believes that the business of building Der Weinerschnitzel restaurants is not 
an activity "affecting commerce...", it should raise that before the trial court where a proper factual 
record on its claim can be made. 
Other courts have applied Section 424 to tort claims like this one. See e.g., Hickle v. Whitney 
Farms, Inc., 29 P.3d 50 (Wash. App. 2001)(industrial factory liable for independent contractor 
farmer's failure to follow government regulations regarding disposal of wastes from factory); Pettit 
v. Dwoskin, 68 P.3d 1088 (Wash. App. 2003)(homeowner liable for contractor's failure to follow 
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building code requirements in construction of deck which collapsed); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. 
Leontarakis, 904 A.2d 846 (NJ. Super. 2006)(landowner liable to adjoining landowner for 
independent contractor's violation of statute requiring lateral support in excavation); Shump v. First 
Continental-Robinwood Ass'n, 644 N.E. 2d 291 (Ohio 1994)(landlord liable for independent 
contractor's failure to install smoke detector as required by city ordinance) 
The Lawson-Avila case referenced the O.S.H.A. crane requirements extensively, though not 
as a separate basis for liability, but in the context of determining "retained control" under Section 
414. However, the Lawson-Avila discussion supports the application of Section 424 here. The trial 
court did not address the application of Section 424, but it should have applied it to require DRC to 
act in a manner that complied with O. S .H. A. requirements. Summary judgment should not have been 
granted here, either. 
POINT FIVE 
DRC READS THOMPSON V, JESS TOO NARROWLY 
The original arrangement was that Circle T would provide the crane rental and operator to 
unload the truss joists that DRC was to purchase and deliver. Because of Ihe unavailability of the 
usual crane and operator, Circle T and DRC jointly assumed that task. And it is undisputed that, in 
fact, it was DRC that hired ABM Crane Rental, that dropped the load on Celso Magana, Fact 28. 
Because DRC "assumed the responsibility" of providing the crane company, and agreed to split the 
cost, ABM Crane was the agent of both DRC and Circle T. Thus, the negligence of ABM Crane in 
lifting an unsafe load is imputed to DRC. 
Further, the trial court need not have even focused on "control"of Ted Alexander, because 
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the facts suggesting that Brett Campbell participated in the negligent act are sufficient on their own 
to establish "direct" negligence on DRC's part, without resort to the "control" of a third party 
theory. A party is always liable for its own negligence, even if that negligence is coupled with the 
negligence of another. Here, the jury could find that both parties, DRC and Circle T, were negligent 
in the way that the second load was rigged and lifted. If Brett Campbell and Ted Alexander were 
equally at fault for the negligent rigging, then DRC and Circle T would each bear 50% of the fault, 
and 50% of the liability, without resort to any doctrine of imputed or vicarious liability. 
Essentially, DRC reads Thompson v. Jess too narrowly, to only apply when the general 
contractor's superintendent is barking out orders like a Marine drill sergeant. "Active participation" 
is reduced to a caricature when read as DRC does. "Active participation" means what is says: active 
participation, not micro-managing every detail of the project. 
CONCLUSION 
From all this evidence, there is a fair question for a jury whether DRC's activities were 
"actively participation" or "passive nonparticipation" under the "retained control" doctrine of 
vicarious liability. There were hotly disputed facts, and hotly disputed conclusions to be drawn from 
undisputed facts. The trial court's summary judgment should be reversed. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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